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Abstract We study a principal-agent model in which the agent can
provide ex post additional relevant information regarding his performance.
In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse, that is, evidence that a
poor result is only due to factors outside his control. However, building a
convincing case requires time, time that is not spent on exerting productive
effort, and thus generating information represents an opportunity cost. We
obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for the principal to prefer a policy
of adjusting ex post the performance measure for the information provided
by the agent to a policy of conforming to a result-based system with no
adjustments. The risk aversion and a possible limited liability of the agent
play an important role in the analysis. This paper clarifies the issues asso-
ciated with the so-called “excuse culture” prevailing in some organizations.
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1 Introduction
“In an excuse culture, instead of focusing on generating good re-
sults and being committed to achieving their targets, employees
spend considerable amounts of time making excuses and lobby-
ing their evaluators (...). And the negotiation and, potentially,
appeal process distract employees from the real tasks at hand.”
Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) p. 470.
Evaluation schemes in practice swing between two extremes: result-
based with no adjustments or result-based with adjustments for the impact
of uncontrollable factors. The latter approach might be beneficial in re-
ducing the risk borne by the agent; but agents, by providing the relevant
information, are often themselves at the origin of the adjustment, which
may lead to an undesirable “culture of excuses” characterized by agents
who spend too much time on unproductive influence activities (Milgrom
and Roberts 1988) rather than on productive tasks.
In this contribution, we introduce into a standard principal-agent model
the idea that the agent can provide ex post relevant information regarding
his performance. In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse: evidence
that a poor result is only due to factors outside his control. He may also
provide hard information that a good result is not a windfall due to a favor-
able environment but is brought about by his own performance. However,
generating relevant information requires time, time not spent on exerting
productive effort. It represents an opportunity cost. We suppose that the
principal has the opportunity to encourage or not the production of relevant
information through the design of the incentive scheme.
The opportunity cost of generating information is a key parameter in
the analysis. For the agent to be able to provide relevant information, es-
pecially a legitimate excuse, two conditions must be met. First, the true
performance, once the effect of external factors has been filtered out, must
be good. Second, the agent must be able to provide verifiable and convincing
evidence to the principal. A productive effort, which is what the principal
really wants to encourage, has two opposite effects: it increases the prob-
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ability of a good performance, but decreases the probability of providing
verifiable information. The equilibrium between the two effects, and thus
the degree of informativeness of this additional information, is a function of
the opportunity cost of generating information.
In this analysis, we give due attention to the empirical fact that evalua-
tors may not be able to condition rewards on whether or not an adjustment
has been made.1 Such an impossibility to contract on the details of the
production of the performance measure might arise if the task of verifying
the information is performed by a third party, an auditor for instance. As
argued by Arya and Glover (2008), managers routinely provide corrections
that may be incorporated in the final audit. Conditioning pay on the extend
to which the result has been adjusted, seems either prohibitively costly or
unverifiable. Thus, only the final result is verifiable, but not all the details
of its production.
Firstly, as a benchmark we assume that the principal is able to offer
the most complete contract, i.e. to differentiate the incentive scheme on
the provision of additional information. There are three possibilities. If the
opportunity cost of providing information is high, a result-based system with
no adjustments is optimal. For intermediate values, the principal rewards
the provision of an excuse, but with a lower wage than the one resulting
from an uncorrected good result. If the opportunity cost is sufficiently low,
the principal again always rewards the provision of an excuse, but now with
a higher wage than in a case of a good result without additional information.
In this scheme, the principal induces the agent to provide further information
even if the result is good: in order to obtain the highest possible reward,
the agent has to prove that a high result is not a windfall. Although rare in
practice, such situations may occur when the information directly available
1Larmande and Ponssard (2008) provide anecdotal evidence on how an appeal process
might be implemented in practice. In this case study of the implementation of an EVA
incentive scheme, introduced initially to foster a culture of results, the company did adjust
the result when excuses were considered legitimate. For instance, by neutralizing the
impact of a devaluation of local currency on the cost of invested capital, or the impact
a regulatory change in the calculation of pension cost. While results were adjusted, the
bonus function remained unchanged. Equity concerns were advanced to motivate such
practices.
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to the principal is of poor informativeness, and much of the information is
provided by the agent, information easily verifiable and not too costly to
produce. As an illustration, the reward system of professors in universities
comes to mind, wherein the information used for stewardship is the number
of extra hours, of theses supervised, publications and editing activities –
information often directly provided by the professors themselves.
Secondly, we suppose that the principal is unable to contract on the fact
that adjustments have been made or not. The same rewards must be offered
whether or not the result has been adjusted. Note that the agent has no
more incentive to prove that a good result is not a windfall – he already
obtained the highest possible bonus. Thus, only excuses may be provided.
The main change arises for intermediate values of the opportunity cost. The
benefit of rewarding excuses is then to detect shirking more effectively in the
case of a low outcome: the fact that the result is low and that the agent
is unable to provide an excuse is very informative of shirking. The risk of
punishing an agent who has made an effort is thus lower. The drawback
of rewarding excuses is to increase the likelihood of a windfall: rewarding
with a high wage an agent who has actually shirked. The optimal contract
depends then on the risk aversion of the agent. With high risk aversion more
weight is put on the former effect than on the latter, and allowing excuses
is optimal. With low risk aversion, the reverse holds.
In practice, evaluators may also be constrained in the possible punish-
ment they can impose in case of a poor result. In Section 3, we investigate
the impact of the agent’s potential limited liability. Not allowing adjust-
ments is in this case more often optimal because of the rent the agent now
earns, which represents another agency cost for the principal. For intermedi-
ate values of the opportunity cost, rewarding excuses leads to a higher rent,
which can outweigh its risk-sharing advantage. Then, only if the agent’s risk
aversion is sufficiently high is the policy of rewarding excuses optimal. We
show that this is the case even if the principal can differentiate the rewards
when an adjustment takes place.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature directly related to the topic. Section 3 presents the model and
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gives a synthetic preview of the results. Sections 4, 5 and 6 respectively
characterize the optimal incentive scheme under the three possibilities we
consider. Section 7 concludes. The proofs may be found in the appendix.
2 Related literature
Providing an excuse is an example of an “influence activity”(Milgrom and
Roberts (1988)). That is, an action of lobbying the principal that is costly
because the time spent doing it is not devoted to valuable productive activ-
ities, but which provides valuable information not directly available to the
evaluator otherwise. Here, the information concerns the result of the agent’s
effort; whereas in Milgrom and Roberts, it relates to abilities for a higher
position.
Manipulating the result through “windows dressing” is another example
of an action that is unproductive – the true performance is not affected –,
and may be costly due to the time it required. Yet, the principal could well
be better off to let the agent undertake this unproductive action. Feltham
and Xie (1994) argue that using a performance measure prone to costly ma-
nipulation such as accounting numbers might be optimal because the overall
noise is lower than the noise of another measure (the share price) less easy to
manipulate. Demski (1998) introduces the idea that the possibility of ma-
nipulation depends on the productive action itself. Dutta and Gigler (2002)
and Demski et al. (2004) provide alternative justifications that are not based
on a risk-sharing issue. In our work, the agent does not directly manipulate
the measure but influences the information process used to determine the
bonus. However, as in Demski, the likelihood of the provision of an excuse
depends on the productive effort. Moreover, here the noise of the measure
is not uniformly affected: if the opportunity cost is not too great, accepting
excuses makes a poor result less noisy (more informative of shirking) – with
the possible drawback of increasing the noise for a good outcome.
Another closely related paper is Arya and Glover (2008). They analyze
a setting in which the agent can provide additional information ex post. As
noted previously, they consider that the incentive scheme cannot be subject
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to the condition of whether or not additional information has been provided.
In their model, the agent performs two tasks. They analyze whether the
principal is better off to accept an excuse related to one task or to accept
an excuse only when verifiable information for both tasks is provided. In
our work, we compare an excuse contract with a no-excuse contract. They
assume a risk-neutral agent, while we introduce risk aversion. We point out
that a trade-off arises for intermediate values of the informativeness of an
excuse: the likelihood ratio of a windfall is higher when excuses are allowed;
whereas, the likelihood ratio of not rewarding an agent who has made a
productive effort is lower. This trade-off does not appear when the agent is
risk-neutral: only the former likelihood ratio matters.
3 Model
A principal (she) hires an agent (he) to work on a task during one period.
The agent may either make a productive effort (a = e associated with a
private cost Cp = C > 0) or shirk (a = 0, Cp = 0). The result of the
task, denoted y, may either be high (good) or low (insufficient), denoted
as yH and yL respectively, with yH > yL. Let pi(a) = Prob(yH |a) denote
the probability of obtaining a high result, given the choice of action a. A
productive effort increases the probability of obtaining a high result: pi(e) >
pi(0).
Ex post, the agent can provide additional and verifiable information
regarding his task. This additional information might be a legitimate excuse;
that is, evidence that a poor result is due to an adverse environment and that
if the effect of the environment is filtered out, the underlying performance is
actually high. Or, it might be evidence that a high result is not a windfall,
that is, only due to a favorable environment. However, the gathering of
information is not free: building a convincing case takes time, time not
spent on the productive task. Therefore, we assume that the probability,
denoted q(a), of generating verifiable information that may convince the
principal is lower when the agent makes a productive effort: q(e) ≤ q(0).
The lower q(e) relative to q(0), the larger the opportunity cost for generating
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verifiable information.
Let us provide now the information structure in more detail. See our
Figure 1. We assume that the result y is a garbling of the underlying per-
formance x that can be high: x = xH , or low: x = xL. The agent influences
only the random variable x, not the garbling between x and y. The principal
does not observe the performance x, only the result y. Let p(a) represent the
probability of obtaining a high performance xH if the agent chooses action
a. Let nH denote the probability of obtaining a high result, conditionally
on the performance being equal to xH , and nL denote the probability of
obtaining a low result, conditionally on the performance being equal to xL.
We have therefore:
pi(a) = p(a)nH + (1− p (a))nL (1)
It is assumed that nH > nL and p(e) > p(0).
The additional information the agent can provide relates to the decompo-
sition of the result into controllable performance and external environment:
with probability q(a), he is able to provide this decomposition; that is, to
prove the value of his performance x.
The principal is risk-neutral. The agent is risk-averse. The agent has a
utility function increasing, concave and separable in wage and private cost,
u (w) − CP . The expected utility of the agent must at all times be higher
than a given reservation utility u0. Two cases will be further distinguished
depending on whether the agent is or is not protected by a limited liability.
The limited liability entails that wage w must always be non-negative.
We assume that the principal always wants to implement action e. More-
over, we assume that she is able to commit to rewarding only verifiable in-
formation provided by the agent. We rule out any renegotiation after effort
based on soft information as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). We want to
know when it is optimal for the principal to design a contract in which the
verifiable information provided by the agent is taken into account.
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Likelihood ratios of an effort
As usual in agency theory, the likelihood ratio of whether the agent did
or did not make an effort plays a crucial role in the analysis. Denote this
likelihood ratio RH when a high result is observed and RL when a low one
is:
RH = pi (e) /pi (0) (2)
Similarly,
RL = (1− pi (e))/(1− pi (0)) (3)
We will say that the agent provides a (legitimate) excuse when the result
is low and he provides evidence that his performance is high. Let  represent
this event. Denote R the likelihood ratio of an effort when such an excuse
is provided. Given the choice of action a, the probability that the agent
provides an excuse is the probability that jointly the true performance is
high (x = xH), the uncorrected result is low (y = yL), and the excuse is
provided; that is, p(e)q(e)(1− nH). Thus:
R = p(e)q(e)(1− nH)/(p(0)q(0)(1− nH))
= p(e)q(e)/(p(0)q(0)) (4)
We will say that the agent proves that a high result is not due to a
windfall when he provides further evidence that his performance is high.
Let η represent this event. The probability of this event is p(e)q(e)nH . The
associated likelihood ratio Rη is equal to R. In other words, when the agent
provides additional information, we have the same likelihood ratio whether
the result is high or low because the agents control only the performance
and not the garbling between the performance and the result.
For notational simplicity, henceforth let R denote either of the two
likelihood ratios.
We have for certain RH > 1 > RL, while R may be higher than RH ,
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lower than RL or anywhere in between, depending on the opportunity cost
of providing an excuse, i.e. the ratio q(e)/q(0). The higher the opportunity
cost, the lower this ratio and the lower R. Intuitively, the higher the op-
portunity cost, the lower the incentive for the principal to allow the agent to
provide an excuse. This intuition is globally correct in our setting, regardless
of the precise characteristics of the contract. This feature is demonstrated
in Figure 2 that presents a synthetic preview of our results. How the bound-
ary evolves between allowing and not allowing for adjustments will now be
discussed in detail. The role of risk aversion will also be analyzed.
For future convenience, we introduce the probability that the result is
high or, if the result is low, that the agent provides an excuse. Denote ϕ(a)
this probability.
ϕ (a) = pi (a) + q(a) (1− nH) p (a) (5)
Note that this probability is always higher than pi(a).
Additional assumptions. We assume finally that nH < 1 and q(e) > 0. If
nH = 1, then it is not possible to have a high performance and a low result,
thus making the provision of an excuse pointless. If q(e) = 0, providing
additional information is a certain proof of shirking. In this case, it would
never be optimal to reward the agent who provides an excuse. Moreover,
we will assume, when the agent has an unlimited liability (Sections 4 and
5), that p(e)q(e) < 1, otherwise ϕ(e) = 1, which implies that the policy of
adjusting is always optimal with an agency cost equal to zero since it is in
this case possible to provide incentives to the agent without placing any risk
on him.
4 Unlimited liability and complete contracting
In this section, we make two assumptions. First, the principal can punish
the agent with an arbitrarily large negative wage: the agent has a potentially
unlimited liability. Second, the principal may differentiate the wages in the
event additional information is provided by the agent: she can use a contract
as complete as she wants.
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Given the binary nature of both x and y, there are four possible wages.
They depend on the result yH or yL and on the eventual provision of addi-
tional information by the agent proving that the performance is xH , denoted
i, where i stands either for  or η. The wages are denoted wH , wL (if the
agent does not provide evidence that the performance is xH) and wiH , w
i
L
otherwise. Using the revelation principle, we restrict our attention to direct
truthful mechanisms; that is, contracts for which wiH ≥ wH and wiL ≥ wL.
The principal rewards the provision of information by the agent when
either a low result with an excuse is more rewarded than a low result alone,
wiL > wL, or a high result with additional information is more rewarded
than a high result alone, wiH > wH . When such is the case, we will say that
the policy of adjusting for uncontrollable factors is optimal.
The program to solve for the principal is (using uj instead of u(wj) for
notational simplicity):
min
wiH ,w
i
L,wH ,wL
p(e)q(e)nHw
i
H + p(e)q(e)(1− nH)wiL
+ (pi(e)− p(e)q(e)nH)wH + (1− ϕ(e))wL
under the constraints:
(p(e)q(e)− p(0)q(0))[nH(uiH−uH) + (1− nH)(uiL − uL)]
+ (pi(e)− pi(0))(uH − uL) ≥ C (6)
p(e)q(e)[nH(u
i
H−uH) + (1− nH)(uiL − uL)]
+ pi(e)uH + (1− pi(e))uL − C ≥ u0 (7)
uiH ≥ uH (8)
uiL ≥ uL (9)
Proposition 1. If Rε > RH , adjusting is always optimal, with wiH = w
i
L >
wH .
If RL < Rε < RH , adjusting is always optimal, with wiH = wH > w
i
L > wL.
If Rε ≤ RL, adjusting is never optimal.
When the opportunity cost of generating information is low, if Rε be-
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comes sufficiently large such that Rε > RH , then the agent has incentive
to provide not only legitimate excuses because wiL > wL but also evidence
that a high result is not a windfall since wiH > wH . He receives the same
reward when he provides additional information, independently of whether
the result is high or low (wiH = w
i
L), since, as already mentioned in Section
4, the agent does not control the garbling between the performance and the
result. When the agent is able to prove that x = xH , the most informative
state is attained and thus deserves the highest possible wage.
If Rε ∈]RL, RH [ , it is optimal to reward the provision of an excuse, but
with a lower wage than a high uncorrected result (wH > w
i
L). The principal
does filter the effect of the performance measure, but the reward is lower.
Furthermore, the agent has no incentive to provide additional information
if the result is high (wiH = wH).
If the opportunity cost is high, the provision of information is the least
informative state: Rε < RL, and thus it is optimal not to reward it.
5 Unlimited liability and incomplete contracting
The analysis developed in the previous section relied on the assumption that
the principal can offer different rewards depending on whether the result has
been corrected or not. In some circumstances, these differentiated rewards
are not feasible. In this section, we assume therefore that the principal is
restricted to offering the same reward in the case the uncorrected result is
high or an excuse is provided proving that the performance is high. Using
the notation of previous section: wiL = wH = w
i
H . Note that there is no
longer incentive to prove that a high result is not a windfall. Only excuses
will be provided by the agent. This event is denoted .
The principal must choose between an excuse contract in which legiti-
mate excuses are rewarded and a no-excuse contract in which no adjustment
is ever made. Let wH , wL be the wages in the no-excuse contract. There are
now only two possible wages if excuses are rewarded: wL if the uncorrected
result is low and the agent does not provide an excuse; and wH when the
result is high, or if the result is low and an excuse is provided.
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If the principal decides to use a no-excuse contract, her program is (again
using uj instead of u(wj)):
min
wH ,wL
pi(e)wH + (1− pi(e))wL
under the constraints:
pi(e)uH + (1− pi(e))uL − C ≥ pi(0)uH + (1− pi(0))uL
pi(e)uH + (1− pi(e))uL − C ≥ u0
The first constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint, the second
one the individual rationality constraint.
If the principal commits to the excuse contract, her program is identical
except that ϕ(.) is used in place of pi(.) so that the probability of obtaining
wH is now ϕ(a) and for the wages w

H , w

L in place of wH , wL.
For notational simplicity, let g stand for either pi or ϕ, and wgH stand for
wH or w
ε
H ; and w
g
L represent wL or w
ε
L, according to whether the principal
uses an excuse or a no-excuse contract.
Lemma 1. The optimal wages depending on the contract (g) selected by the
principal are:
wgL = u
−1 (u0 − g(0)C/(g(e)− g(0)))
wgH = u
−1 (u0 + (1− g(0))C/(g(e)− g(0)))
The reward for the low result, wgL, depends, positively, on the likelihood
ratio of an effort for the high result, g(e)/g(0). The reward for the high
result, wgH , can be rewritten as u
−1(u0+ C1−(1−g(e))/(1−g(0))) and thus depends
positively on the likelihood ratio for the low result, (1− g(e))/(1− g(0)).
Thus, the comparison of the rewards from the no-excuse and the excuse
contracts reverts to the comparison of their likelihood ratios. As the next
lemma shows, this can be done by positioning the likelihood ratio Rε with
respect to RH and RL.
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Lemma 2.
wεL ≤ wL ⇔
ϕ(e)
ϕ(0)
≤ pi(e)
pi(0)
⇔ Rε ≤ RH
wεH ≤ wH ⇔
1− ϕ(e)
1− ϕ(0) ≤
1− pi(e)
1− pi(0) ⇔ R
ε ≥ RL
The first equivalence in Lemma 2 shows that the excuse contract is less
informative than the no-excuse one for a high result, ϕ(e)/ϕ(0) ≤ pi(e)/pi(0),
if and only if the provision of an excuse is less informative than a high uncor-
rected result, Rε ≤ RH . For a low result, the most informative technology is
the one with the higher likelihood ratio of shirking, or equivalently the lower
likelihood ratio of making an effort. Thus, the second equivalence in Lemma
2 states that the excuse contract is more informative for a low result if and
only if the provision of an excuse is more informative than a low uncorrected
result, Rε ≥ RL.
Since RH ≥ RL, if Rε ≥ RH , we also have Rε ≥ RL. When this condition
holds, Lemma 2 indicates that the spread of wages is lower with the excuse
contract: wL ≤ wεL ≤ wεH ≤ wH . At the other extreme, if Rε ≤ RL, the
reverse is true – the spread of wages is lower with the no-excuse contract:
wεL ≤ wL ≤ wH ≤ wεH .
As the agent is risk-averse, the higher the spread, the higher the incentive
cost. Thus, in both cases it is possible to rank unambiguously the contracts.2
Proposition 2 is a direct extension of Proposition 1 for the extreme values
of R.
Proposition 2. If Rε ≥ RH , the excuse contract is always optimal.
If Rε ≤ RL, the no-excuse contract is always optimal.
Consider now the intermediate case. There are two opposite effects.
First, because the provision of an excuse is less informative than a high un-
2This proposition is actually a particular case of a more general result shown by Kim
(1995). When the likelihood ratio distribution of an information system t is a mean pre-
serving spread of the likelihood ratio distribution of another information system h, then
the principal always prefers t, regardless of the preference of the agent (the utility func-
tion). When Rε ≥ RH and Rε ≤ RL, it is possible to order both monitoring technologies,
excuse and no-excuse, using the MPS criterion.
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corrected result, rewarding excuses increases the likelihood ratio of giving a
windfall bonus to an agent who has shirked. This effect increases the incen-
tive cost. Second, because the provision of an excuse is more informative
than a low uncorrected result, rewarding excuses decreases the likelihood
ratio of punishing an agent who made an effort. This effect decreases the
incentive cost. The balance between the two effects depends on the specific
utility function of each agent, as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 3. If RL < Rε < RH , either contract may be optimal.
In particular, if the utility function is u(x) = xα/α, with α ≤ 1, there is a
limit α0 such that ∀α ≤ α0, the excuse contract is optimal.
Proposition 3 shows that the higher the risk aversion of the agent (that
is, the lower α), the more costly is the risk of punishing an agent who has
made an effort, as compared to the cost of the potential windfall bonus. The
excuse contract is in this case more likely to be optimal.3
An interesting remark can be made. Intuitively, if the agent is more
likely to provide an excuse when he shirks (Rε < 1), then there should
be no point to rewarding the excuses. However, since RL < 1, the excuse
contract might still be optimal in that case. The explanation is that the
benefit of a contract that rewards excuses occurs only when the agent is
unable to provide an excuse. The fact that the result is low and that the
agent is unable to provide an excuse is very informative of shirking. The
risk of punishing an agent who has made an effort and gets a low result
is smaller. Thus, the excuse contract may be optimal even if providing an
excuse is bad news in the sense that the agent is more likely to provide an
excuse when he shirks.
6 Limited liability
In this section, we assume that the agent has a limited liability and that this
constraint is binding at equilibrium. The principal would like to offer a neg-
3We were not able to show the converse of the second part of Proposition 3: ∀α > α0,
that the excuse contract is optimal. However, a great number of numerical simulations
leads us to conjecture that the converse always holds.
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ative wage in some cases, but she cannot: all wages must be equal or above
zero. This assumption fits well the incentive structure inside companies: the
principal is limited in the possible punishment she can impose on the agent
– it is unusual to ask the agent to give money to the firm, and most of the
incentive must come from the bonus. We will look at two cases in sequence:
complete contracting (counterpart of Section 4, but with limited liability),
incomplete contracting (counterpart of Section 5).
6.1 Complete contract
Since wiH ≥ wH and wiL ≥ wL, due to the restriction to direct truthful
mechanisms, only two constraints need be added to the program of the
principal stated in Section 4.
wL ≥ 0
wH ≥ 0
The latter constraint clearly cannot bind at equilibrium, otherwise we would
have a fixed-wage contract.
Proposition 4. If Rε > RH , adjusting is always optimal, with wiH = w
i
L >
wH .
If 1 < Rε < RH , the optimal policy, adjusting or not, depends on the risk
aversion of the agent.
If Rε ≤ 1, adjusting is never optimal.
When 1 < Rε < RH , as demonstrated by the proof, we can say more
about the choice of the principal. If the utility function of the agent is
u(x) = (x + x0)
α/α, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and x0 > 0, there exists a cutoff α1
such that rewarding the providing of information is optimal if and only if
α < α1. That is, the policy of adjusting is optimal if and only if the agent
is sufficiently risk averse. The assumption x0 > 0 is crucial. If x0 = 0, that
is, if we were using the utility function of Proposition 3, then the agent is
infinitely risk averse close to minimum wage zero. In that case, rewarding
excuses, even with a small wage, is always optimal.
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The introduction of limited liability reduces the range over which ad-
justing is optimal. Comparing with the complete contracting case with
unlimited liability (Proposition 1 of Section 4), the range over which it is al-
ways optimal not to reward the excuse is enlarged. Firstly, we have RL < 1.
Thus, inside the bracket ]RL, 1[, rewarding excuses is never optimal when
the limited liability binds, whereas the reverse is true: rewarding excuses is
always optimal when the limited liability does not bind.
Secondly, above 1 and below RH , not rewarding excuse might still be op-
timal in the limited-liability case; whereas it is never the case with unlimited
liability of the agent.
Thus, when the limited liability is binding, there is a shift in favor of
not adjusting. Indeed, with limited liability, the agent earns rent, which
generates an additional agency cost on top of the risk premium necessary
for the agent to accept to bear risks. For a monitoring technology g, this
rent is equal to g(0)C/(g(e)− g(0))− u0 and thus depends (negatively) on
the informativeness of a high outcome. When Rε ≤ RH , the no-excuse
contract generates a lower rent than the excuse contract and thus is more
often optimal than with unlimited liability.
6.2 Incomplete contracting
Again, we need to add the limited liability constraint wL ≥ 0 to the programs
of Section 5. Recall that g stands for either pi or ϕ, and wgH (w
g
L ) stands
for wH or w
ε
H (respectively wL or w
ε
L). The limited liability constraint is
binding if and only if u0 ≤ g(0)C/(g(e) − g(0)). We suppose that this
condition holds throughout this section for at least one of the monitoring
technologies. We now have the equivalent to Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. If the limited liability binds, the optimal wages depending on the
contract (g) selected by the principal are:
wgH = u
−1(C/(g(e)− g(0))
wgL = 0
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Here we have a counterpart to Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 5. If Rε ≥ RH , the excuse contract is always optimal.
If Rε ≤ 1, the no-excuse contract is always optimal.
Proposition 6. If 1 < Rε < RH and the utility function is u(x) = xα/α,
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, there is a limit α2 ∈]0, 1[ such that the excuse contract is
optimal if and only if α ≤ α2.
Note that, as in the complete contracting case, RL is now replaced by
1.4
When the limited liability constraint binds, results are very similar whether
or not the principal is restricted to using only a bonus function: for interme-
diate values of R, the optimal contract depends on the risk aversion of the
agent. This configuration is in sharp contrast with the case of unlimited
liability (again, see Figure 2).
Moreover, in this case, a very straightforward explanation of why it is
never optimal to reward excuses when R < 1 can be provided, assuming
that the limited liability binds for both contracts. As ϕ(e) ≥ pi(e), the bonus
is always paid more often with the excuse contract than with the no-excuse
contract. If R < 1, then the bonus of the excuse contract, given Lemma
3, is higher. A higher bonus and paid more often: the excuse contract is
clearly not optimal when R < 1.
6.3 Risk neutrality
The limited liability constraint with a risk-neutral agent is often used as
a substitute for the risk aversion of the agent as the source of the agency
conflict with the principal. In this case, as the next proposition shows, only
the likelihood ratio for the high outcome plays a role.
4The reason why 1 now replaces RL is explained in Larmande (2013). When the limited
liability binds, the MPS criterion of Kim is no longer necessary to order two monitoring
technologies, regardless of the utility function of the agent. A less stringent condition
exists that involves the comparison of likelihood ratios for the high outcome and the
comparison of marginal productivities of effort. The latter condition takes here the form
of R below 1.
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Proposition 7. When the agent is risk-neutral and the wages are con-
strained through a limited liability condition, then the principal prefers to
adjust if and only if Rε ≥ RH .
Arya and Glover (2008) analyze an appeal model in which the agent is
risk-neutral and protected by a limited liability. The agent has two tasks
and can make an effort or not in each of them. The outcome is high only
if the results of the two tasks are high. As in our model, the effort gives
rise to a performance that is only observable by the agent. Arya and Glover
consider two monitoring technologies. In the case where the outcome is not
high, either the agent has the choice to cherry-pick which of the two tasks
is appealed (i.e. the agent can decide to provide a verifiable excuse for the
task selected), or the two tasks are jointly appealed if the agent decides to
appeal. A proposition similar to our Proposition 7 is proved. We conjecture
that Arya and Glover’s result does not extend directly to a risk-averse agent.
6.4 Preference of the agent
Consider now the preference of the agent regarding whether or not the prin-
cipal should encourage the communication of additional information. It
depends on the expected rent he may earn. With unlimited liability, this
rent is zero, and thus the agent is indifferent. When the limited liability
constraint binds this rent, as already mentioned, depends (negatively) on
the informativeness of a high outcome. Thus, given Lemma 2, the agent
prefers the excuse contract if and only if R ≤ RH . If the opportunity cost
of generating an excuse is low, the agent prefers a result-based contract
without any adjustments. On the contrary, when this cost is intermediate
or high, the agent would prefer a contract that takes excuses into account.
In general, the preferences of the agent and of the principal are opposed:
the rent is a direct transfer from the principal to the agent. There is one case
in which their preferences might be aligned: within the interval ]1, RH [ ; that
is, when the opportunity cost of generating excuses assumes intermediate
values. In this case, the agent prefers excuses to be taken into account
because it generates a higher rent. The principal might also prefer the
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excuse contract, but for another reason: such higher rent is an influence
cost that the principal accepts to pay because the risk borne by the agent
is lower, and thus a lower risk premium is needed.
7 Concluding remarks
This research contributes to the understanding of the potential benefits and
pitfalls of introducing a culture of excuses, giving due attention to practical
constraints encountered in the design of the contract. Consider a situation in
which the agent can convince the principal that his or her performance has
been good in spite of an unfavorable environment. Also consider that equity
requires that the allocation of a bonus be equal to the one the agent would
have obtained for a high uncorrected result. Under these circumstances, we
prove that the allowance of fishing for excuses, with the risk of rewarding
the time spent on excuse building rather than on productive effort, might
still be beneficial to the principal. This will be true only if the opportunity
cost of making excuses, i.e. spending time on unproductive tasks to be in a
good position to provide verifiable evidence, is not too large. Risk aversion
of the agent extends the range over which the excuse contract is optimal.
These results have been proved to hold in a context of unlimited or limited
liability. They also hold in a context in which the principal may differentiate
the wages in the event the agent provides additional information. The exact
boundaries that characterize the range under which each form of contract is
optimal has been precisely delineated. We also provide predictions for the
preference of the agent regarding this issue. Altogether the model provides
a number of predictions which will be worth testing in an empirical setting.
Our formal analysis has several limits that deserve further research.
First, we have assumed no asymmetry of information regarding the probabil-
ity of gathering verifiable evidence. Relaxing this assumption for the excuse
contract might lead to separating equilibria where low performing agents
might be asked not to work. We conjecture that our result may still be valid
when the asymmetry of information is small. Second, we assume no moral
hazard on the principal’s side. Relaxing this assumption and analyzing the
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fishing for excuses in a relational contract, as in Macleod (2003), might yield
interesting results. Third, the model is a simple binomial model. Does our
result hold in a multinomial or a continuous model? Arya and Glover (2008)
find similar results in a trinomial model, but more work needs to be done
to assess the generality of the result.
Finally, the model assumes that the performance evaluation is performed
directly by the principal or by an independent internal or external auditor.
In practice, this evaluation may also be delegated to a supervisor, for in-
stance the direct line manager of the agent. This evaluation can itself be
plagued by moral hazard. The policy of adjusting, based on a subjective
assessment by a supervisor, would be more prone to moral hazard and col-
lusion than the no-excuse contract, based on information provided through
the company’s control system. This effect can reduce the potential benefits
of rewarding excuses.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Both the incentive compatibility constraint and the individual rationality
constraint are binding, leading to the derivation of the optimal wages.
Proof of Lemma 2
From Lemma 1 wL ≤ wL if and only if
ϕ(e)
ϕ(0)
≤ pi(e)
pi(0)
By definition ϕ(e)ϕ(0) =
pi(e)+q(e)p(e)(1−nH)
pi(0)+q(0)p(0)(1−nH) , so that
ϕ(e)
ϕ(0)
≤ pi(e)
pi(0)
⇔ q(e)p(e)(1− nH)
q(0)p(0)(1− nH) ≤
pi(e)
pi(0)
⇔ R ≤ RH
From Lemma 1 wH ≤ wH if and only if 1−ϕ(e)1−ϕ(0) ≤ 1−pi(e)1−pi(0) . That is,
1− pi(e)− q(e)p(e)(1− nH)
1− pi(0)− q(0)p(0)(1− nH) ≤
1− pi(e)
1− pi(0)
⇔ (1− pi(0))(−q(e)p(e)(1− nH)) ≤ (1− pi(e))(−q(0)p(0)(1− nH))
⇔ 1− pi(e)
1− pi(0) ≤ R

⇔ RL ≤ R
Proof of Proposition 1
Let λ1, λ2, µ1 and µ2 denote the Lagrange multipliers for the four constraints
of the program of the principal. The objective function of the principal can
be rewritten as
p(e)q(e)[nH(w
i
H − wH) + (1− nH)(wiL − wL)] + pi(e)wH + (1− pi(e))wL
Because nH < 1 and nH > 0 we can multiply (8) by nH and (9) by
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(1− nH).The first-order Lagrangian conditions are:
p(e)q(e)f ′(uiH) = (p(e)q(e)− p(0)q(0))λ1 + p(e)q(e)λ2 + µ1 (10)
(pi(e)/nH − p(e)q(e))f ′(uH) = −(p(e)q(e)− p(0)q(0))λ1 − p(e)q(e)λ2
− µ1 + (pi(e)− pi(0))/nHλ1 + pi(e)/nHλ2 (11)
p(e)q(e)f ′(uiL) = (p(e)q(e)− p(0)q(0))λ1 + p(e)q(e)λ2 + µ2 (12)
(1− ϕ(e))/(1−nH)f ′(uL) = −(p(e)q(e)− p(0)q(0))λ1 − p(e)q(e)λ2 − µ2
− (pi(e)− pi(0))/(1− nH)λ1 + (1− pi(e))/(1− nH)λ2 (13)
Adding (10) and (11) we obtain
p(e)q(e)nH(f
′(uiH)− f ′(uH)) + pi(e)f ′(uH) = (pi(e)− pi(0))λ1 + pi(e)λ2
Because f ′ increases (as f is convex) and because uiH ≥ uH , we obtain
pi(e)f ′(uH) ≤ (pi(e)− pi(0))λ1 + pi(e)λ2 (14)
Combining this latter inequality with (11) and noting that pi(e)/nH−p(e)q(e) ≥
0, we obtain
µ1 ≥ (p(0)q(0)− p(e)q(e)pi(0)/pi(e))λ1 (15)
If R < RH , then by (15), either µ1 > 0 or λ1 = µ1 = 0. In the latter
case (10) and (11) imply that f ′(uiH) = λ2 = f
′(uH). Thus, if R < RH ,
then uiH = uH .
Conversely, assume that uiH = uH . Then (14) and (15) hold with equal-
ity. If R > RH , then p(0)q(0)−p(e)q(e)pi(0)/pi(e) < 0. The only possibility
is that µ1 = λ1 = 0. Then (10) and (12) (and the fact that w
i
H ≥ wiL)
imply that f ′(uiH) = f
′(uiL) = λ2 and µ2 = 0. Because µ1 = λ1 = µ2 = 0,
(13) becomes f ′(uL) = λ2. Thus, all wages are equal in this case, which is
impossible. Therefore if R > RH , we have uiH > uH .
The same reasoning can be used for the low outcome. Adding (12) and
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(13) leads to:
f ′(uL) ≤ −pi(e)− pi(0)
1− pi(e) λ1 + λ2
Substituting into (13) we obtain:
µ2 ≥ (p(0)q(0)− p(e)q(e)(1− pi(0))/(1− pi(e)))λ1 (16)
Following the same reasoning as above, if R > RL, then uiL > uL. And if
R < RL, then uiL = uL, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
As a first step, we are going to show that, given two monitoring technologies
t and h, if the following two inequalities hold,
1− t(e)
1− t(0) ≤
1− h(e)
1− h(0) (17)
h(e)
h(0)
≤ t(e)
t(0)
(18)
it will be proved that the principal always prefers t to h, whatever the utility
function of the agent.
Denote uhH = u0+(1−h(0))C/(h(e)−h(0)) and uhL = u0−h(0)C/(h(e)−
h(0)). By construction whL = u
−1 (uhL) and whH = u−1 (uhH). Symmetrically,
denote utH = u
(
wtH
)
and utL = u
(
wtL
)
.
Lemma 2 shows that (17)⇔ utH ≤ uhH and (18)⇔ uhL ≤ utL.
As the individual rationality constraint is binding, h(e)uhH+(1−h(e))uhL =
t(e)utH + (1 − t(e))utL = u0 + C. Thus, h increases the spread of utilities
necessary to provide the incentive to the agent (uhL ≤ utL ≤ utH ≤ uhH) while
keeping the same mean (expected utility). As u−1 is convex:
h(e)u−1(uhH) + (1− h(e))u−1(uhL) ≥ t(e)u−1(utH) + (1− t(e))u−1(utL)
that is, the incentive cost associated with h is higher than the cost associated
with t. Thus the principal always prefers t to h.
As a second step, on the one hand, if R ≥ RH , Lemma 2 shows that
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1−ϕ(e)
1−ϕ(0) ≤ 1−pi(e)1−pi(0) and pi(e)pi(0) ≤ ϕ(e)ϕ(0) . The principal always prefers ϕ, that is, the
excuse contract.
On the other hand, if R ≤ RL, then Lemma 2 shows that the inequalities
are in reverse order. The no-excuse contract is always optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3
Denote uL = u(w

L) = u0 − ϕ(0)C/(ϕ(e) − ϕ(0)), uH = u(wH) = u0 +
(1 − ϕ(0))C/(ϕ(e) − ϕ(0)), uL = u(wL) = u0 − pi(0)C/(pi(e) − pi(0)) and,
uH = u(wH) = u0 + (1 − pi(0))C/(pi(e) − pi(0)). Let IC and IC denote
the respective expected wages paid by the principal (the minimum of the
objective function of the principal).
Lemma 2 can be directly extended to show that R < RH ⇔ ϕ(e)/ϕ(0) <
pi(e)/pi(0)⇔ uL < uL, and that R > RL ⇔ uH < uH .
Because the participation constraint is binding,
pi(e)uH + (1− pi(e))uL = u0 + C = ϕ(e)uH + (1− ϕ(e))uL
Example where the no-excuse contract is optimal. Consider the following
function u−1: u−1(x) = uL for x ≤ uL, and u−1(x) = x for x > uL. Then,
IC = pi(e)uH + (1− pi(e))uL = u0 +C and IC = ϕ(e)uH + (1−ϕ(e))uL =
u0+C+(1−ϕ(e))(uL−uL). Since ϕ(e) < 1 and uL−uL, we obtain therefore
IC > IC .
Example where the excuse contract is optimal. Consider the specific
utility function u(x) = xα/α. The excuse contract is optimal if and only if
the expected wage is lower, that is,
pi(e)(uH)
1/α + (1− pi(e)) (uL)1/α − ϕ(e)(uH)1/α − (1− ϕ(e)) (uL)1/α ≥ 0
Let ∆(α) denote the LHS of the above inequality. As uL < uL < u

H < uH
(because of Lemma 2), ∆(α)/(uH)
1/α goes to pi(e) when α goes to 0. As
pi(e) > 0, there is an α0 such that ∀α ≤ α0, ∆(α)/(uH)1/α > 0. Thus,
∀α ≤ α0 the excuse contract is optimal.
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Proof of Proposition 4
First if R > RH (resp. R < RL), a proof similar to the proof of Proposition
1 show that adjusting is always optimal (resp. adjusting is never optimal).
Assume from now on that R ∈]RL, RH [.
The limited liability is binding, thus wL = 0 and the individual rational-
ity constraint is slack. Moreover, for the same informativeness reason than
in the unlimited liability case, as R < RH , uiL ≤ uH and uiH = uH . As a
result uH > u(0) otherwise the incentive constrained is not satisfied.
We can rewrite the program as follows:
min
uiL,uH
p(e)q(e)(1− nH)f(uiL) + pi(e)f(uH)
under the constraints
(p(e)q(e)− p(0)q(0))(1− nH)(uiL − u(0)) + (pi(e)− pi(0))(uH − u(0)) ≥ C
uiL ≥ 0
Denote respectively λ and µ the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the two constraints. The first order Lagrangian conditions are:
pi(e)f ′(uH) = λ(pi(e)− pi(0))
p(e)q(e)(1− nH)f ′(uiL) = λ(p(e)q(e)− p(0)q(0))(1− nH) + µ
If R < 1 then p(e)q(e) ≤ p(0)q(0). Moreover since f is strictly increas-
ing, λ is always strictly positive. The second Lagrangian constraint gives
µ > 0: excuses are never taken into account. By continuity it is also the
case if R = 1.
Assume now that R > 1 and that the utility function has a power
shape u(x) = (x + x0)
α/α with x0 > 0. By combining the two Lagrangian
conditions we obtain
µ = (p(e)q(e)−p(0)q(0))(1−nH)α1/α−1
(
R
R−1(u
i
L)
1/α−1 − RH
RH−1(uH)
1/α−1
)
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Denote
µ0 = (p(e)q(e)− p(0)q(0))(1− nH)α1/α−1(
R
R − 1u(0)
1/α−1 − R
H
RH − 1(u(0) + C/(pi(e)− pi(0)))
1/α−1
)
As uH ≤ u(0) + C/(pi(e) − pi(0)) and uiL ≤ u(0), µ ≥ µ0. Moreover µ0
can be rewritten as (p(e)q(e)− p(0)q(0))(1−nH)(αu(0))1/α−1Φ(α) in which
Φ(α) = R

R−1 − R
H
RH−1
(
u(0)+C/(pi(e)−pi(0))
u(0)
)1/α−1
.
Since R < RH , we have Φ(1) > 0. On the other hand, when α goes to
zero, Φ(α) goes to −∞. By the theorem of intermediate value, as Φ(α) is
continuous, there exists an α1 ∈]0, 1[ such that φ(α1) = 0. As Φ is strictly
increasing with respect to α we obtain that Φ(α) > 0 if α > α1 and Φ(α) < 0
if α < α1.
If α > α1, then µ ≥ µ0 > 0. Thus uiL = u0: excuses are never taken into
account. By continuity, it is also the case if α = α1.
If α < α1, excuses are always taken into account. Assume the con-
trary. Then uiL = u0 and the incentive constraint implies that uH =
u(0) + C/(pi(e) − pi(0)). Thus µ = µ0 < 0 which is impossible. Thus
excuses are always taken into account.
We have shown that excuses are taken into account if and only if α < α1.
Notice that, if x0 = 0, then µ0 < 0, which means that excuses are always
taken into account (otherwise, uiL = u0, uH = u(0) + C/(pi(e)− pi(0)), thus
µ = µ0 < 0 which is impossible).
Proof of Proposition 5
For a given monitoring technology g , let ICgll denote the incentive cost when
the wages are 0 and f(C/(g(e)−g(0))) (that is, the optimal wages when the
limited liability binds) and ICgunll when the wages are f (u0 − g(0)C/(g(e)− g(0)))
and f (u0 + (1− g(0))C/(g(e)− g(0))) (the optimal wages when the limited
liability is omitted). Since the program in which the limited liability binds
is more constrained than the program where this constraint is omitted, we
have ICgll ≥ ICgunll. Denote ICx and ICx, for x ∈ {ll, unll} the incentive
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costs for the no-excuse contract and the excuse contract respectively.
Assume first that R < 1. If both limited liability constraints bind then
the no-excuse contract is always optimal because the bonus is lower (as
R < 1 and given Lemma 3) and paid less often (as pi(e) ≤ ϕ(e)). Thus,
ICll ≤ ICll. Moreover, as R < RH , Lemma 2 shows that ϕ(e)/ϕ(0) ≤
pi(e)/pi(0). Given the condition found in Lemma 3, if only one of the limited
liability constraints binds, that constraint is necessarily the one of the excuse
contract. In that case, by combining ICunll ≤ ICll and ICll ≤ ICll, we
obtain ICunll ≤ ICll. Thus, the no-excuse contract is also optimal when the
limited liability binds for only one monitoring technology.
Assume now that R > RH . Then R > 1, and ϕ(e)−ϕ(0) ≥ pi(e)−pi(0).
Since u−1 is a convex function, ∀0 < x ≤ y, (u−1 (y) − u−1(0))/y ≥
(u−1(x) − u−1(0))/x. Because 0 < C/(ϕ(e) − ϕ(0)) ≤ C/(pi(e) − pi(0)), we
obtain:
u−1(C/(pi(e)− pi(0)))− u−1(0)
u−1(C/(ϕ(e)− ϕ(0)))− u−1(0) ≥
ϕ(e)− ϕ(0)
pi(e)− pi(0)
Moreover, because R > RH , then pi(e)/pi(0) < ϕ(e)/ϕ(0). Then:
ϕ(e)− ϕ(0)
pi(e)− pi(0) ≥
ϕ(e)
pi(e)
We obtain:
pi(e)u−1(C/(pi(e)− pi(0))) + (1− pi(e))u−1(0)
≥ ϕ(e)u−1 (C/(ϕ(e)− ϕ(0))) (1− ϕ(e))u−1(0) (19)
Because pi(e)/pi(0) < ϕ(e)/ϕ(0) and given the condition of Lemma 3,
if the limited liability constraint binds for the excuse contract, then this
constraint also binds for the no-excuse contract. Thus either both limited
liability constraints bind, or only the limited liability constraint of the no-
excuse contract binds.
Assume first that both limited liability constraints bind. Then (19)
shows that the incentive cost is lower with the excuse contract.
Now assume that the limited liability constraint binds only for the no-
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excuse contract. As explained above, ICll ≥ ICunll always holds. Moreover,
(19) shows that ICll ≥ ICll. Thus, we finally obtain ICll ≥ ICunll, and the
excuse contract is always optimal.
Proof of Proposition 6
Since R < RH , if only one limited liability constraint bind, it is the one of
the excuse contract, as shown above. Assume first that the limited liability
constraint also binds for the no-excuse contract. The no-excuse contract
is optimal if and only if ϕ(e)u−1
(
C
ϕ(e)−ϕ(0)
)
≥ pi(e)u−1
(
C
pi(e)−pi(0)
)
. As
u−1(y) = (αy)1/α, this condition is equivalent to
ϕ(e)
pi(e)
−
(
ϕ(e)− ϕ(0)
pi(e)− pi(0)
)1/α
≥ 0
Let ∆(α) denote the LHS of the above inequality. The no-excuse contract
is optimal if and only if ∆(α) ≥ 0. ∂∆∂α = 1α2 ln
(
ϕ(e)−ϕ(0)
pi(e)−pi(0)
)(
ϕ(e)−ϕ(0)
pi(e)−pi(0)
)1/α
.
As R > 1, ϕ(e)−ϕ(0) > pi(e)−pi(0). Thus ∂∆∂α > 0: ∆(α) increases with
respect to α. Moreover, because R < RH , then ϕ(e)/ϕ(0) < pi(e)/pi(0) and
thus ∆(1) > 0. And as ϕ(e)− ϕ(0) > pi(e)− pi(0), ∆(α) goes to −∞ when
α goes to 0. Given the intermediate value theorem, there exists a cutoff
α2 ∈]0, 1[ such that ∆(α2) = 0. The monotonicity of ∆(α) gives that the
no-excuse contract is optimal if and only if α is above α2.
Assume now that the limited liability does bind only for the excuse
contract. In that case, the no-excuse contract is optimal if and only if
ϕ(e)(αuH)
1/α − pi(e)(αuH)1/α − (1− pi(e))(αuL)1/α ≥ 0
⇔ ϕ(e)(uH/uL)1/α − pi(e)(uH/uL)1/α − (1− pi(e)) ≥ 0 (20)
Denote Γ(α) the LHS of the above inequality. As R > 1 ≥ (1− pi(e))/(1−
pi(0)), following Lemma 2, we have uH < uH . Moreover, uL < uH . Thus
Γ(α)(uL/uH)
1/α = ϕ(e)(uH/uH)
1/α − pi(e) − (1 − pi(e))(uL/uH)1/α which
goes to −pi(e) < 0 when α goes to zero. As all wages are positive, Γ(α) is
strictly negative for α close enough to zero.
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If α = 1 the agent is risk neutral and only the likelihood ratio for the
high outcome matters. Then the no-excuse contract is strictly optimal.
We are going to show now that Γ(α) is either always increasing, or first
increasing then decreasing.
Γ′(α) = − 1
α2
(uH/uL)
1/α
[
ϕ(e) ln(uH/uL)− pi(e) ln(uH/uL)(uH/uH)1/α
]
Denote Φ the function in bracket. When α goes to zero, Φ goes to −∞
because uH/u

H > 1, Φ is thus strictly negative. Moreover Φ is always
increasing. Two cases are possible: Φ ends up to be still negative when α =
1, then Γ′ is always positive and Γ always increasing. Or Φ becomes positive
at some point and remains positive thereafter, because it is monotonic, then
Γ′ is first positive then negative and Γ first increasing then decreasing.
To sum up, Γ(α) is strictly negative when α is close to zero and strictly
positive for α = 1. In between this function is either always increasing,
or increasing then decreasing. In both cases, by the intermediate value
theorem, there exists one and only one α2 ∈]0, 1[ such that Γ(α2) = 0.
Moreover Γ(α) > 0 if and only if α > α2 that is, the no-excuse contract is
optimal if and only if α > α2.
Proof of Proposition 7
When both limited liability constraints bind, the excuse contract is optimal
if and only if
ϕ(e)
C
ϕ(e)− ϕ(0) ≤ pi(e)
C
pi(e)− pi(0)
This inequality holds if and only if ϕ(e)/ϕ(0) ≥ pi(e)/pi(0), that is, given
Lemma 2, if and only if R ≥ RH .
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Figure 1: Information structure
31
 Characteristics of the 
contract 
The principal should adjust 
 depending on the likelihood ratio R 
Section Complete 
contract? 
Limited 
liability? 
0                RL RL               1 1               RH RH            +           
4 Yes No     
5 No No 
   
YES if the 
agent risk 
aversion is 
high 
 
6.1 Yes Yes 
NO  YES 
6.2 No Yes       
 
 
Figure 2. Summary of the results 
